It was not until the current women's movement started raising our consciousness of female subordination and male dominance in society that this notion of women's inferiority was reassessed in academic and popular media. Lakoff's Language and Women's Place (1975) was one of the first and most influential works stating that it was inequality between the sexes in society that was reflected in language use, rather than the genetic inferiority of women. Because of the low status of women and the social pressure for them "to talk like a lady," Lakoff stated that women tend to use more hedges, qualifiers, empty adjectives, polite forms, and so forth, conveying their unassertiveness and insecurity, trivializing their speech, and denying accountability and responsibility for their talk.
Several charges against Lakoff have been raised. Some critics have questioned the validity of her methodology, noting that her analysis was based on unsystematic observations and intuition. Other researchers have tested her hypotheses about "women's speech" (the most famous of which is her presupposition that tag questions are used more by women) and have come up with contradicting results (e.g., Crosby & Nyquist 1977;  Dubois & Crouch 1975) . 5 In addition, what Lakoff identified as "women's language" has been seen as confounding social status with sex (e.g., O'Barr & Atkins i980). 6 In addition, Lakoff's judgments about women's speech -that it is a deficient and ineffective style, deviant and inferior compared with the usage of "canonical" speakers -have been criticized. There are two problematic issues. One is that the canonical speaker of the language in the United States, who is seen as the most representative of its speakers, is the adult, middle-class, white male speaker (Shibamoto I985:I9) . There is already a male bias built in regarding "the standard" and "the norm" of the language, which Lakoff did not question. The other issue is that, therefore, characteristics of women's speech were identified by their difference not from a truly neutral standard, but from the male norm. Women's speech, and only women's speech, was seen as a deviation from the norm and as marked. Although she called attention to male dominance and the double bind women have while speaking, Lakoff did not acknowledge the asymmetrical treatment of women and men and showed androcentrism in her judgment of what is the proper, desirable use of language. Thus, although some researchers (e.g., Coates & Cameron I988) regard Lakoff as taking the dominance approach, because she brought the issue of power into the analysis, others see her as taking more of the "deficit position" (see Henley & Kramarae I99I; Johnson I983; Kramarae I990; Spitzack & Carter I987). This "female deficit theory" has led to the belief held by some that to be effective speakers women must learn to "speak like a man," for example, learn how to be assertive.
Since Lakoff presented her hypotheses on sex differences in language, many studies have been carried out on this issue. Research has been done, on the one hand, by researchers who deal with isolated variables in speech such as counting the occurrence of tag questions or other social stratification studies (e.g., Trudgill 1975).7 On the other hand, there are researchers who look at variables in contextually situated interactions. Thorne, Kramarae, and Henley (I983:14) maintained that it is the study of language in contexts of actual use that has yielded the most fruitful results. Such studies on mixedsex interaction, for example, have been done by Fishman (I983) and by West and Zimmerman (I983), and their analyses have been sensitive to the effect of power and dominance. These works have claimed that there is a sexual division of labor in conversation and that male dominance is not only a cause of this difference, but the difference in turn maintains the dominance. Power and dominance are not only the attributes of individual males; the power the society grants to males affects and is reflected in the conversation, because interaction does not happen in a vacuum (West & Zimmerman I983, I985) . These studies have been regarded as the main proponents of the dominance or power-based approach.
The dominance approach of this type, then, sees sex difference as something that occurs in the context of interaction, and this difference is analyzed within a larger context of patriarchy.8 Unlike Lakoff's approach, it sees language practices of women as neither deviant from, nor inferior to, the male norm, distinguishing their studies from those taking the deficit position. However, at least two major shortcomings of this dominance/power-based approach can be ascertained. First, similar to the deficit position, it also tends to confound power with sex. As is discussed later, sex structure and power structure are indeed closely tied together (Henley 1977 (I988) found that in mixed-sex conversations in a work setting, sex differences in the pattern of floor management overrode the status differences. The problem is that the dominance/power-based approach neglects to conceptualize sex except in terms of power. Its notion of the female-male category system seems too simplistic; power is not the only factor that differentiates the sexes.
Second, there are dimensions to power besides gender, such as race, ethnicity, age, occupation, socioeconomic status, education, and sexual orientation. The accounts of sex difference in conversation given by Fishman (I983) and West and Zimmerman (I983, I985) did not attempt to identify these other dimensions. Their studies focused on, for the most part, white, middle-class, and college-educated women and men, without much reflection on how the other aspects of the participants' identities apart from their gender may affect their behavior in cross-sex interactions.9 For example, the functions of certain conversational behaviors, such as interruption or minimal responses, cannot be described in terms of an abstract notion of male dominance separated from the context. However, by neglecting to examine how the White-ness and middle-class-ness affect the form of male dominance, the dominance/power-based approach seems to assume that the White middle-class norm can be appropriately used as the standard and that there is no need to examine the White middle-class system of sex organization in its own right.
Along with the concern with sex differences in language use, feminist researchers have raised the need to investigate sex differences in the availability of the English code itself. In addition to inspecting how women use language, researchers are also concerned about how language, as a system that organizes the world, treats women. Some feminist researchers have challenged the assumption that language is a neutral, value-free vehicle for communicating thoughts, claiming that language does not serve the same function for the dominated as it does for the dominant. The dominant groups have the power to control the linguistic code; thus language is made fit for the expression of their thoughts and experiences, but not those of oppressed groups. Women are one such group, and the oppression is manifested in the sexism and the relative invisibility of women in the code. Therefore, women find language inadequate to express their own experiences directly.
Women's reality is not well represented in the language, making it difficult for women themselves to see their reality as "real," and even more difficult for women to have their reality treated as "real" by men.1" They must reframe their experience in order to express it in the language of men; they are thus the "muted group."'1 As a result, what women are encoding into the same form of speech may be completely different, unique experiences of their own, whereas most studies of language were done on men's language use by male scholars. Women speaking in women's groups may lead to their empowerment; therefore, in order to discourage them from talking, women's talk has been derided and trivialized by men.
The notions of legitimacy and value in women's talk and their meaningfulness to women's identity have been stimulated by, and have triggered the increase of, studies on all-female discourse. According to Coates and Cameron (I988), Jones's (I980) analysis of gossip as women's oral culture was a ground-breaking work that conceptualized women as a "culture." Jones actually went so far as to postulate that women constituted a "speech community" while being a part of a larger speech community. Cameron (I985) Thus, what makes Maltz and Borker's difference/cultural approach distinct is not so much the view that women and men are members of different cultures as it is the notion that female-male communication problems can be analyzed in terms of miscommunication occurring from cultural difference and not dominance. The statement that the difference/cultural approach allows the analysis of miscommunication without casting blame on either sex (Tannen iggob) implies that the dominance/power-based approach does blame either men for dominating or women for being dominated. Dominance as a concept is being treated at the individual level, as a matter of intention and interpretation. It is not being treated at the social and institutional levels, which many studies taking the dominance/power-based approach actually do -a point that is returned to later.
The proponents of the difference/cultural approach also claim that their view enables us to see females and males as conversing in different but Similarly, the approach itself can be attractive to a researcher. It is culturally sensitive to both sexes, less susceptible to being interpreted as claiming female deficiency or to being accused of engaging in male-bashing activities. In addition, using this approach, the problem could be dealt with by in-depth focus on two clear-cut variables, female and male, without getting caught up in the complexity of power issues in the society. However, this difference/cultural approach has a number of problems. In the following, I first briefly describe the major arguments made by this approach, point out what I see as defective with those arguments, and then proceed to argue why the separa-tion of dominance (or power) from difference (or culture) is impossible in the analysis of gender and why a theory of sex difference that does not consider the power issue is inadequate. 
CULTURAL

PROBLEMS IN THE CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACH TO CROSS-SEX COMMUNICATION
The difference/cultural approach suggests that women and men will interpret each other's behavior according to their own rules for friendly interaction. Thus, if miscommunication occurs, it can be explained in terms of the cultural differences. This is where I find the first problem with this approach -it assumes that same-sex rules will directly be carried over to mixedsex interaction. But neither Maltz and Borker nor Tannen offered any empirical evidence that women and men will indeed use the same rules to interpret their conversation partner's behavior regardless of their sex. Tannen (I986, I99oc) only provided anecdotes that imply that women will seek the same supportive response, or rapport talk, from their husbands as they receive from their female friends and that they will feel hurt or frustrated if they are instead answered with jokes or advice. Tannen (I99oc) also gave her own reactions to girls' and boys' talk when she was analyzing their videotaped interaction for her study (Iggob) and compared them with the reactions reported from men. Tannen found the girls' talk appealing and cute, which she noted was typical of women, whereas the boys' restlessness and mocking made her nervous. On the other hand, she found that men thought of the boys' energy and poking fun as cute, whereas they did not like the girls' behavior of sitting so still and showing obedience to the experimenter. So she concluded: "Boys and girls grow up in different worlds, but we think we're in the same one, so we judge each other's behavior by the standards of our own" (Iggob:254).
This statement sums up the gist of the cross-cultural miscommunication view, and it seems to be too critical a claim to make without some results from a more systematic observation offered as support. How accurate is it to say that we would see the context as the same, and therefore the norms of interpretation as the same, whether the interaction was between partners of the same sex or of a different sex? It may be possible for the sex of one participant to greatly affect the topic, genre, key, rules of interaction, and norms of interpretation in a speech event (Saville-Troike 1989). In their study of conversation content between same-sex friends, Aries and Johnson found that women would talk with their close friends about things they would not with their husbands (Aries & Johnson I983; Johnson & Aries I983b). It seems unlikely that the sex of the conversation partner would affect the topic but not the standards by which they judge her or him. Also in Tannen's example of judgmental difference between women and men on girls' and boys' behavior, if by any chance the girls had behaved like the boys (being restless, teasing and putting each other down, "challenging" the experimenter's authority, etc.), would men have interpreted that as "cute"? We have certain standards for judging people in general, and this may be developed through our living in the world of our own sex, but we also have certain standards for judging females and males, quite separately from what we have learned through our interaction with same-sex peers.
The framework of cross-sex communication as cross-cultural communication seems too simplistic, mainly because no matter how much time children spend interacting with their same-sex peers, they are not completely segregated from the other sex. While they are learning the rules for friendly conversation from their peers, they are also open to the pattern of interaction of their opposite-sex peers, to that between their parents, and to other various conversations, real or fictional. They internalize the culturally prescribed sex-role stereotypes, learning how girls and boys are supposed to differ in the ways they behave and interact. They would not be in the same situation as "real" intercultural encounters, say, between Japanese and American autoworkers assembled to work in the same plant, where each member had not been truly exposed to the other's culture prior to the encounter.
Moreover, there seems to be a problem in the use of the term cross-cultural itself. This term implies a static approach that "can only lead to lengthy lists of comparative differences between countless cultures; the results of which are impossible to digest or apply in any meaningful way" (De Francisco iggoa:2). The cross-cultural view of sex differences in talk can lead us to compare the differences between females and males on isolated variables of speech (e.g., how conversation involvement is expressed and interpreted). If we take this approach, there would be nothing important to note about women's communication unless a comparable difference from men's is found, and vice versa. From this standpoint, the issue of female-male communication becomes relevant only if we assume that these differences are static and constant and will directly be carried over from same-sex conversation. However, communication between members of different cultures involves more than interpreting each other according to one's own rules and The final thing to note about the difference/cultural approach to sex differences is that, like the dominance/power-based approach, this view also ignores the interaction of race, class, age, and sexual orientation with sex (Henley & Kramarae I99I; Kramarae I990). Women and men belong to many interconnected social groups in addition to that of their own sex, and an individual is more than just a "woman" when interacting with others. Maltz and Borker offered their difference/cultural framework to explain "American men and women" (I982:I96), but this generalization neglects the cultural and ethnic diversity, as well as the existence of racial tension in the United States."3 Tannen (I99Oc) used her illustrative anecdotes from a relatively homogeneous group: seemingly well-educated, middle-class, heterosexual Americans. It seems strange that although she has elsewhere (Tannen I984, I986) analyzed differences in conversational style between Jewish New Yorkers and non-Jewish Californians, which overrode sex differences, these findings are not incorporated into her difference/cultural approach.14 Here, sex is emphasized as if it is the single major factor that affects conversation, one that could be treated independently of other variables.
THE PROBLEMS OF DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE
As noted before, the difference/cultural approach is presented as an alternative to the dominance/power-based approach, stating that power has little to do with what happens in conversation between socially equal females and males. This approach, then, will be applicable only with situations where "women and men attempt to talk to each other as friends and equals in casual conversation" (Maltz & Borker I982:212; emphasis added). This restriction is greater than it may seem. Not too many mixed-sex interactions actually satisfy this condition; besides, who are counted as "friends" and "equals" is open to a wide and complex range of interpretation. In any event, the framework cannot be used in contexts where status is involved, such as the classroom (Aries i987; '5 Treichler & Kramarae I983), the workplace, communication between doctor and patient, salesperson and customer, mother and son, father and daughter, and even in some cases, between spouses. Indeed, one may ask: When exactly do women and men interact as equals? It may be tempting to answer that friends would be equal. The difference/cultural approach responds to our need and desire to believe that essentially, women and men are socially equal. However, being social equals can mean two things: being socially equal in principle and being socially equal in reality. The former does not necessarily entail the latter. And when the concept of equality interacts with sex, I suggest that we have two levels to consider -an individual in relation to another individual and a member of one sex in relation to a member of either the same or different sex. Truly social equals must be equal in reality at both levels. And I assert that in crosssex relationships this is impossible today in U.S. society. As a female, I am seldom socially equal to someone who is male, even when we share other identifies such as ethnicity, age, class, and education.
To illustrate, let us take the case of street remarks or unsolicited comments from strangers (Gardner I980; Kissling I99I; Kramarae I986b), a common form of mixed-sex interaction where social status is not likely to be so relevant, unless the occupation of either or both parties is obvious. These remarks occur almost exclusively in the form of males addressing females, and this asymmetry itself implies that there is some inequality involved here. Against the addressee's charge of insult or harassment, the addresser can justify himself by saying that it was only a compliment; he was trying to be nice and friendly; and no, of course he had no intention of dominance! But would he have said the same thing to a man? Would he have accepted a similar remark addressed to him by a woman as a compliment or a sign of friendliness? What gives him the right to do this act that cannot be reciprocated? It is the mere fact of his being male and the other being female that does; males and females are not, in this sense, equal.
The problem I find with the difference/cultural approach is that it does not consider this level where male dominance exists regardless of what the individual intends. It sees dominance as something that could be misinterpreted as existing in interaction, although not really there. The proponents of the difference/cultural approach state that although men's behavior in cross-sex conversation may seem to exercise dominance, the same behavior functions to show intimacy with male friends; therefore, the male dominance is not intended but a result of cultural difference and miscommunication.
The proponents seem to consider that the lack of intention means that dominance does not really occur. They regard dominance as a matter of interpretation, dominance is seen as being in the same category as evaluative judgments such as "weakness," passivity," and "deficiency," the difference being only that the latter were how females' behaviors were interpreted according to male norms, whereas the former is how males are interpreted according to female norms. It seems that either the judgmental attribute "dominating" had been confounded with the act of dominance or the two had been equated. True, one's comments can be falsely interpreted as being dominating without the intention to dominate, but dominance occurs or does not occur, regardless of intention. The cross-cultural miscommunication approach can explain how and why men's behavior is seen as dominating by women, can deny that all men have the intention to dominate, and can say that the attribute "men are dominating" is not necessarily true, and these are important issues that had not been adequately raised by the dominance/ power-based approach. But it cannot say that male dominance does not occur as a mechanism in interaction.
The Because of U.S. society's patriarchy, males are given the institutional power that in turn reinforces the social system, and this male dominance is guaranteed and maintained through the sexual division of labor. The difference/cultural approach does acknowledge the fact that in U.S. society it is men whose talk is valued more and that it is usually women who are labeled negatively (e.g., as "nags"), punished for their talk, and told to change (Tannen I99Oc:15, 31, 75). The reason for this, however, is not pursued, and neither is the effect of this on daily interactions between women and men. If we deny the existence of a hierarchical organization of the sexes, what accounts for the asymmetrical treatment between the language use of women and men? And if we admit that there is a hierarchy, a power structure in the society, it is impossible to claim that it will not affect our everyday interaction. The difference/cultural approach deals with female-male communication as if it existed independently of this structure, as if the immediate context of the conversation was sufficient to fully grasp the meaning of the interaction. To the contrary, it is the sociocultural structure that makes the interaction relevant, and this behavior in turn maintains this structure.'6 The issue here is not whether we cast blame on women or men for problems in communication, but it is whether we recognize that interactions between women and men are operating within a social hierarchy.
The observation of power structure can also be made when we look at the speech patterns acquired by girls and boys through same-sex interactions with peers. Girls' principles of cooperation, collaboration, equality, sharing and relating and showing empathy perfectly coincides with the "typical" female characteristics: nurturing, supportive, expressive, emotive, friendly, relationship-oriented, and other similar adjectives, which are also associated with "weakness" and "powerlessness." Boys' patterns, on the other hand, involve competing for and holding on to the floor, asserting, challenging, arguing, showing one's dominance and verbal aggressiveness, which are associated with "powerful" and "masculine" traits. Tannen's (iggoa) own work investigating sex differences in ways conversational engagement was expressed showed results consistent with these stereotypical traits assigned to females and males. Maltz and Borker did not suggest the reason girls and boys learn these specific rules, for example, why in girls' interaction it is unacceptable to be "bossy" and why in boys' they must learn to assert dominance. Socialization per se cannot sufficiently explain why gender traits are not symmetrically assigned.
As Cameron, McAlinden and O'Leary (I988:80) pointed out, it is not a coincidence that men can afford to be aggressive and hierarchically oriented conversationalists, whereas women are expected to provide conversational support. Nor does it seem to be a coincidence that men's roles are more likely to be those of the protector, the teacher, the expert, in relation to women (Tannen I99oc). The sexual division of labor shows a pattern that is too consistent with the pattern of dominance to assume that it occurred "naturally." The set of prescriptions females and males learn as children follows the culture's norms of how females and males should behave, which, in turn, is in line with the positions in which women and men are placed in the social hierarchy. The sexual division of labor in conversation is not a mere result of cultural differences. The difference, by virtue of its function of creating the expectation that women will naturally try harder to involve men in the talk, whereas men will look aloof and disengaged in the eyes of women, reinforces the pattern that women will (and must) do more work in the conversation than men. If we do not consider why it is the women who are supposed to do more work to show that they are engaged (and are called "bitches" if they refuse to, are called "nags" if the job is not done appropriately, but get no credit for doing it right), we are led to justifying this inequality and legitimizing the privilege given to men to toil less in conversation.
IS ''DOMINANCE
Another question arises when we focus our attention on the "miscommunication," which is said to be caused by the cultural differences between the sexes. The difference/cultural approach considers the miscommunication as the end result of the female-male interaction, as something problematic for both sexes and as something that can be solved. That is the reason, it is argued, why it is important to make a cross-cultural comparison and come up with a list of differences; for if we understood, or at least became aware of, each other's different ways and assumptions better, we would be able to see the cause of miscommunication and refrain from making negative attributions to individuals (Tannen I986, I99ob, I99Oc ). Yet it seems that it is necessary to go a step further from the causal analysis of the phenomenon, to see the consequences of miscommunication. The unstated assumption is that, between social equals, miscommunication will produce equally negative results for both parties involved.
But how accurate is this really? Tannen's anecdotal examples of femalemale miscommunication (I986, I99Oc) give me the impression that women have more to lose from the miscommunication than their male partners. This is so partly because of the very nature of women's and men's "conversational styles" as Tannen puts it. Take, for example, a situation where a women starts telling her husband about some troubles she had at work (from Tannen I986). According to her rules of intimacy, she expects her husband to show understanding, reassure her that she is not alone in having trouble, and maybe share his own problems with her. Instead, he, according to his rules of expressing solidarity in conversation, cracks jokes, sidetracks her story, and offers solutions to her problem. She then feels trivialized and thinks he's claiming one-upmanship; he then feels frustrated, not understanding why she got upset. What is the consequence of this miscommunication? She may feel that he does not respect her, he is putting her down, he is insensitive, too logical and rational, and so on. He, on the other hand, may feel that she cannot deal with the problem by herself, does not understand humor, is unreliable or irrational because she says she has a problem but does not want any advice. These attributions made to each other are quite consistent with the negative stereotypes of men and women, but according to the cultural norms that value logic and rationality, her judgment of him does not imply that he is inferior to her, but his judgment of her does imply that she is to him. In addition, the person who actually gets his needs fulfilled, as TroemelPloetz (I991:495) pointed out, is the man -who "solved a problem and presented his solution," who "did what he needed to do," whereas the woman "did not get what she needed in her situation."
For women, in addition to these psychological damages, there are more materialistic concerns involved in the outcomes of the miscommunication. In U.S. society, it is usually the men who are in control of the resourceswho make more money, have more physical power, are in a more authori-tative or a higher social position -thus it is more likely to be men who can reward or punish women for their behavior.
If miscommunication is no one's "fault" and is something that can be analyzed as mutual misunderstanding of well-meant behavior, why is it that casualties are more often heavier on women than on men? Acquaintance rape and wife abuse could, with the miscommunication approach, be termed as extreme cases of such miscommunication ( Hierarchies determine whose version of the communication situation will prevail; whose speech style will be seen as normal; who will be required to learn the communication style, and interpret the meaning of the other; whose language style will be seen as deviant, irrational, and inferior; and who will be required to imitate the other's style in order to fit into the society. Yet the situation of sex difference is not totally parallel: sex status intercuts and sometimes contrasts with other statuses; and no other two social groups are so closely interwoven as men and women.
The approach that dismisses this aspect and only focuses on differences has the danger of being used to legitimize blatantly misogynist behavior on the ground that it is a case of innocent miscommunication caused by cultural differences.
CONCLUSION: TREATING GENDER AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
As we have seen, the major critique of the difference/cultural approach is that "cultural difference alone cannot adequately explain the full pattern of language difference and miscommunication" (Henley & Kramarae I991:27) and that the approach downplays "the gender hierarchy and the links between the specifics of female-male interactions and the inequities women experience through . All discussions of how women operate in speech communities must, however, be aware of women's more general social and political position as a subordinate group....
[I]t is all too easy to lose sight of the fact of subordination and describe "sex roles" (in the manner of so many male sociolinguists) as "natural," "facts of life," difference not inequality.
Coates and Cameron added that both "the dominance approach, which stresses the hierarchical nature of gender relations, and the difference approach, which stresses subcultural differences between women and men" are needed for sociolinguistic research on sex difference (I988:72). However, my position is slightly different from theirs. Coates and Cameron were still considering that the three concepts of gender, power and (sub)culture could be separated and are independent of each other. I argue that these are intertwined. To talk about gender is to talk about women and men as composing sociocultural groups, and the main force that constructs these two groups as different is the difference in the position they are placed in within the social hierarchy. If difference and dominance are treated as different perspectives of looking at sex, we will only get two different pictures from two different angles. We would not be able to get a holistic, multidimensional view. Difference and dominance (and there may be other dimensions) should be seen as simultaneously composing the construct of gender. The problem of how to conceptualize gender has so far been dealt with in most language research in a too simplistic way. This comes from a superficial view of sex -the categories of females and males are seen as prelinguistic variables (Kramarae I986a) biologically assigned to individuals at birthand a failure to recognize that gender is in fact a social construct (Kessler & McKenna I978; Kramarae I986a; Rakow I987). We do not become socialized as females or males because we were born female or male. At birth we are assigned to one or the other gender according to our genital organs, but after our initial gender assignment is made, how we are treated and raised is not dependent upon whether we have a vagina or not (a fact that is not obvious under usual circumstances) (Kessler & McKenna I978). We learn female rules because we are socially labeled "female" (from how we are dressed and addressed, etc.) -through the process of "sex categorization" (West & Zimmerman I987) -and we become female through learning and obeying those rules. West and Zimmerman (I987:126-27) maintained that gender is "a routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment" and that it is "the activity of managing situated conduct in light of normative conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate for one's sex category." We are doing gender (Rakow I987; West & Zimmerman I983, I987) through gendered ac-tivity. "(A) person's gender is not simply an aspect of what one is, but, more fundamentally, it is something that one does, and does recurrently, in interaction with others" (West & Zimmerman I987:140). Thus, regardless of our own intentions, the consequences of our behavior must always be seen in the context of the society that defines gender. In U.S. society's system (as well as in many others), part of being female consists of being the dominated, weaker sex. And the difference between women and men is constructed as a fact to reinforce the construction of gender, meaning that the appropriate doing of gender means the reproduction of "the institutional arrangements that are based on sex category" (West & Zimmerman I987:I46).
Gender is one major construct that organizes our world and our social life. It involves all human beings; every individual, after all, cannot escape being categorized as either female or male. But it must also be remembered that gender is so salient because it is a social construct, something that we do in interaction and not something that is based on nature or biology.'7 And it does not exist independently of other social factors such as region, ethnicity, age, class, sexual orientation, and religion; these elements are constantly in interaction. The issue at hand is not whether we should take the dominance/power-based approach or the difference/cultural approach or both approaches to analyze sex differences in discourse. Rather, it is how we can come up with a framework that allows us to see gender as a holistic and dynamic concept regarding language use -a framework that allows us to see how we, in the social context, are doing gender through the use of language. Throughout this article, I distinguish between the use of sex and gender. The convention today is that sex is biological and gender is sociocultural (Schlegel I989). I have used sex to refer to the use of female-male dichotomy as a "prelinguistic variable," as a "set category from birth" (Kramarae i986a). I have used gender to signify that the female-male dichotomy is "manmade" and socially constructed.
3.
Hereafter, unless stated otherwise, all reference to women, men, and language will signify women, men, and English used by the majority of those living in the United States.
4.
Maltz and Borker (I982) and Tannen's works use "cross-sex communication" to indicate the interaction between female and male, which they use parallel with "cross-cultural communication." However, the term cross-cultural must be distinguished from the term intercultural, as is discussed later.
5.
From a linguistic viewpoint, the problem with her hypothesis was that form was separated from function, and women's speech was conceptualized only in terms of form.
6.
O'Barr and Atkins's study on courtroom interaction found that witnesses with little authority and social power, regardless of their sex, used speech forms judged by Lakoff to be used more by women. The researchers therefore concluded that "women's language" as posited by Lakoff could be more adequately labeled as "powerless language." 7.
These studies have found a general pattern of sex differences in pronunciation and grammaticality with women using more standard forms than did men. Trudgill has explained this in terms of female conservativeness and also in terms of the covert prestige with which the men Educational level is often incorporated into the analyses, albeit superficially. However, the effect of advanced education is assessed only in terms of quantity (i.e., the degree of influence on a certain behavior), not in terms of the quality (i.e., how the less explicit beliefs about gender are affected by advanced education).
10.
A weak version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is taken by such feminists, especially those who advocate language change as a step to empowerment. See, for example, Spender (I980).
II.
For a further discussion of the muted group theory, see Kramarae (I98I); Showalter (I98I); Spender (I980).
I2.
For a full review of Tannen's book, see Troemel-Ploetz (I99I).
I3.
Therefore, Maltz and Borker's claims should not be extended to females and males who do not belong to the mainstream American culture. However, it is not clear to what extent the general framework of the difference/cultural approach has been regarded by others as universally applicable. It is very often the case that whenever a framework for analysis is presented using American samples, it is assumed to be universal until a proven otherwise.
14.
In Tannen's analysis of conversation at a Thanksgiving dinner (I984, also cited in I986), the difference in rules for expressing involvement and solidarity is shown to cause misinterpretation of each other's intention and to lead to the perceived conversational dominance of one group, Jewish New Yorkers, who had more expressive ways of showing involvement. She did not, however, report any sex differences.What then, is the relationship among the cultural factors that produce these differences such as regional difference, ethnicity, class, age, and sex? Tannen has drawn an analogy between ethnicity and sex, regarding them both as culture in that they produce different conversational styles. But she has failed to address the fact that ethnicity and sex are not mutually exclusive categories. An individual's conversational style is neither a product solely of her or his sex or ethnicity nor can it be adequately analyzed as such.
15.
Aries admitted that the different/cultural approach cannot be used to analyze classroom interaction, although she evaluated it as the best approach to sex difference. i6.
Here, I am applying the Firthian model of linguistic behavior to the unit of conversation. The sociocultural structure that organizes the hierarchy of the sexes is the context of situation, which is: "the situation which provides the context of experience and context of culture to the language used by the speech-fellowship, speech community, or a language community. This situation is extra-linguistic, and it is through form that a linguist is able to show its relevance (appropriateness) to linguistic behavior" (Kachru I980:94).
17.
But because one's sex category is the base of doing gender, the social order reinforced by the gendered activity is often thought to reflect "natural differences" between female and male, which then legitimizes the hierarchical arrangement as being "natural" (see West & Zimmerman I987).
